How should the EU enforce the rule of law in the member states? Can democratic backsliding be prevented on EU level? Such questions are asked regularly by scholars and politicians, especially since Article 7 TEU procedures have been launched against Poland and Hungary. But what happens afterwards? How can the rule of law and liberal democracy legally be restored? As the 2022 Hungarian parliamentary election is approaching and the opposition has better chance to win than any time in the last decade, it is time to examine these overlooked questions.
The current opposition has already made promises for the case if they win, like adopting a new constitution, setting up a new electoral system or “making the Constitutional Court great again”. How realistic are these promises without a constitutional two-thirds majority? Are there any alternatives for the restitution of the rule of law within the frames of the current Basic Law adopted by the Fidesz-majority in 2011? Could the social demand for independent institutions be strengthened if the Basic Law is (partly or entirely) set aside? What should be learnt from the experiences of the democratic transition of 89/90 in this regard?
