re:constitution
2020/ 2021

Stefan Szwed

Mobility Phase: International IDEA | European University Institute

Choice illusions: Through ‘rule by law’ to ‘electoral capture’ in Hungary, Poland and beyond

Stefan Szwed is Research Associate at the Centre for International Studies (CIS) at the Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR), University of Oxford. His research interests include European foreign policies, conceptions of power in international institutions, and democratic transitions. He has over twenty years of experience in election observation (and some in assistance), predominantly as Political Analyst and Deputy Head of Mission on OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions across the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Eurasia, but has also worked with the UN, EU and several international NGOs in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa. His most recent publication is a monograph Asymmetry Matters: Poland, Germany and state power in a new Europe (Palgrave-Macmillan 2019). He was Mairie de Paris Visiting Fellow at the Centre de Recherches internationales at Sciences Po, Paris. Stefan has a Doctorate (DPhil) in International Relations and a Master’s (MPhil) in European Politics and Society, both from the University of Oxford, and a Bachelor from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, DC.

Choice illusions: Through ‘rule by law’ to ‘electoral capture’ in Hungary, Poland and beyond

Populist leaders across the EU, those in backsliding Member States such as Poland and Hungary in particular, like to champion themselves as true representatives of the people. They pit the principle of genuine democratic choice against the demands of rule of law, which may be defined as protection against abuses of majority rule. In academic discourse and popular polemics, their arguments are most often repudiated with normative claims about democratic exigencies of checks and balances and separation of powers. Few voices question whether populists in office represent actual majorities. I plan to examine the way in which some populist governments that win elections undermine the rule of law not only to advance their visions of an illiberal state, but to neutralise the risk of losing another ballot. Across five different aspects of the electoral process — campaign (rhetoric), media (coverage), complaints and appeals (judiciary), political financing, and election system/administration (reform) — I plan to examine how these regimes lay the foundations for ‘electoral capture’. While their initial tinkering need not necessarily produce immediately dramatic results, cumulative changes remove important safeguards for democratic elections. Consequently, by extinguishing the rule of law, backsliding regimes undermine the very essence of democracy, or the democratic choice.